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A transition from pay-as-you-go pension systems to more private funded systems
is often suggested as a solution to ﬁnance pension systems threatened by ageing.
This paper analyses alternative potential remedies linked to changes in labour market
characteristics, within an international computable overlapping-generations model
of the world economy. A prolongation of the working life of skilled or unskilled
individuals, an increase in the demand for skills, a rise in the education levels and
increased skilled or unskilled immigration have very different outcomes in North-
America and in Europe. In the latter region, a postponement in the retirement age
of unskilled individuals has the most beneﬁcial effect in relieving the ﬁscal pressure
on pension systems, because the proportion of unskilled workers is relatively larger
in Europe than in North-America. In North-America, where skilled labour is more
abundant, an acceleration in skill-biased technical change has the biggest impact on
pensions systems, as it raises the productivity of skilled workers.
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Population is ageing all over the world due to rising life expectancy and declining fertility. During
the next 50 years, the number of people of working age for one pensioner will strongly decrease
in many countries. In the United States and Europe-15, the average number of working-aged per
retiree was equal to 5.2 respectively 4.2 in 2000; this number is expected to reach 2.7 respectively
1.9 in 2050.1 As public transfers are strongly ascending, such a demographic transition imposes
a strong pressure on the ﬁscal policy. In many developed countries, it will be impossible to main-
tain current levels of taxes/pension beneﬁts and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems are thus
undergoing several reforms.
A transition from PAYG pension systems to more private funded systems is often discussed in
countries with important welfare states. However here we will take another perspective. We are
concerned with the consequences of changes in labour market characteristics on the ﬁnancing of
pension systems. Can PAYG pension systems be sustained by postponing the retirement age of
unskilled (or of skilled) individuals, by an acceleration in skill-complementary technology, by a
rise in education levels or by increased unskilled-biased (or skilled-biased) immigration? Do these
modiﬁcations in labour market characteristics have a different outcome when they are applied in
the United States or in Europe? Our analysis relies on a computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model of the world economy and focuses on the economies of two of the model’s developed
regions: North-America (United States and Canada) and the Advanced Countries (Western Eu-
rope plus Australia and New-Zealand). The model features also two types of individuals: skilled
(tertiary education) and unskilled (secondary and primary education). The potential alternative
remedies to ageing suggested here can be thought of being "realistic" i.e. the magnitude of these
policy changes is not excessive. Let us describe the modiﬁcations in labour market characteristics
considered here, before relating our model to the literature and summarizing the results.
The ﬁrst scenario that we take into account is a prolongation of the working life. More pre-
cisely we compare the outcomes of raising the retirement age of unskilled workers (scenario 1)
with the postponement of the one of skilled individuals (scenario 2). In the United States (US)
and in many European countries governments plan to or have already delayed mandatory retire-
ment age. But how much does raising the retirement age help in ﬁnancing the ﬁscal burden due
to ageing? Retirement regimes vary across countries, but also within countries, and mandatory re-
tirement age may for example differ across sectors or professions. Thus another issue raised here
is if changes in retirement age of unskilled professions have a different impact on the ﬁnancing
of pension systems than changes in the one of skilled professions. In fact, skilled workers spend
more time in school than unskilled workers and have thus shorter periods of contributions. But
when they enter the labour force, they usually contribute by higher amounts to (and also beneﬁt
less from) welfare systems. Besides, some countries or regions may be endowed by more skilled
workers than others and policies affecting retirement age of a certain type of workers may not
have a similar result everywhere. Thus do these reforms have a different outcome whether they
are applied in the United States (US) or in Europe?
Another important labour market characteristic is the demand for skills. In fact, the last
decades have been characterized by an increase in skill complementary technologies causing a
rise in wage inequality (between skilled and unskilled workers) and in overall inequalities Ace-
moglu (2002, 2003). An acceleration of SBTC (scenario 3) may also have implications for ﬁscal
policy through changes in the wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers. A modiﬁ-
cation in the skill premium will affect the tax base and thus the contribution to the welfare state.
1Medium variant of the population prospects of the U.N. (2007) and own computations.
1It would thus be worthwhile to know how much technical progress alters the ﬁscal burden and, in
general, the economy. Again the results may differ whether an acceleration of skill-biased techni-
cal progress happens in the United States or in Europe. As the supply of skills is relatively high
in the US compared to Europe, it would also be interesting to investigate how pension systems
in Europe would be affected when the education levels of the European population approach the
ones of the US (scenario 4).2
Furthermore, we investigate if replacement migration can mitigate the pressure on the ﬁs-
cal burden. In most developed countries the ageing process strongly modiﬁes the labour force.
Compared to policies that intend to raise the fertility rates in countries with a projected declining
population, replacement migration has the advantage of augmenting immediately the population
of working age. However immigration changes the demographic structure as well as the skill com-
position of the labour force. The education level of immigrants will thus also have an impact on
the supply of skills. We thus compare how public ﬁnances react when a non-selective immigration
policy (scenario 5) and a selective immigration policy (scenario 6) are carried out.
The ﬁrst computable general equilibrium models (CGE) with overlapping generations - deal-
ing with the viability of pension systems under the threat of ageing - were carried out in a closed-
economy setting (see e.g. the seminal work of Auerbach & Kotlikoff (1987) on the US economy).
However it might be important to investigate the issue with open economy models. Demographic
projections for the 21st century indicate that the population is ageing in various regions of the
world, but this ageing process occurs at different paces all over the world. While it is quite ad-
vanced in OECD countries, like in Europe and Japan, other world regions will experience lower
old-age dependency ratios and their working-age population will still rise. The heterogeneous
ageing process can induce inter-temporal trade, through international capital ﬂows, mitigating the
effects of ageing compared to a situation of economic and ﬁnancial autarky. To take into account
economic openness, small open economy models have been developed, as for example Raffel-
hüschen & Risa (1995) for Norway. As pointed out by Aglietta et al. (2007), these models lack to
explain important relative prices of the economy, because they are based on an exogenous inter-
est rate which establishes the capital intensity of production. In short, they are not "real" general
equilibrium models.
Hence recent models worked out multi-country or multi-region frameworks, built upon de-
mographic projections, to examine the implications of ageing on pension systems when capital
is mobile. Such models have been developed by Fehr et al. (2003), Börsch-Supan et al. (2006),
Ingenue (2005) and Aglietta et al. (2007). The two last studies based on the world model devel-
oped by the French team Ingenue (2001).34 Börsch-Supan et al. (2006) compare the effects of a
generous with a less generous pension system on the economy of different OECD countries. Fehr
et al. (2003) analyse the effects of a privatization of pension systems in the US, Europe and Japan.
Aglietta et al. (2007) and Ingenue (2005) analyse pension reforms for one of their six respectively
2FollowingCheesemanDay andBauman (2000), who carry outprojectionsof school attendanceforthe
US until 2028, we can consider that the proportion of highly skilled individuals in North-America will not
increase in the future, justifyingwhy we do not carryout a simulation of a rise in the educationalattainment
for the North-American region.
3Actually, Aglietta et al. (2007) exploit the ﬁrst version of the Ingenue world model (with six regions),
while the study of Ingenue (2005) builds on an augmented version of the same model (with 10 regions).
4Other large scale CGE models examine the consequences of ageing on international capital ﬂows (At-
tanasio & Violante, 2000; Brooks, 2003; Ingenue, 2001; Feroli, 2003). However as they do not model
PAYG pension systems, they can neither address issues concerning the ﬁnancing of the ﬁscal burden nei-
ther take into account the effects of pension reforms on saving patterns which in turn have implications on
international capital ﬂows.
2ten world regions: Europe. Still all these studies are mainly interested in the impact of pension
reforms on international capital ﬂows and put a lesser focus on the sustaining of pension systems.
The contributions of this paper are thus manifold. From a methodological point of view, the
open economy CGE model of the world economy presented in this paper has the advantage to be a
"real" general equilibrium approach compared to small open economy models. Interest rates will
also react less to demographic changes in a framework that considers 10 world regions than e.g.
in the three-region model of Fehr et al. (2003). Moreover, like the Ingenue models but unlike Fehr
et al. (2003) and Börsch-Supan et al. (2006), we aggregate all the countries in the world in several
regions and we thus take into account in a more global way the effects of the non-synchronous
ageing process on capital movements.
From the point of view of the issues addressed here, the implications of changes in various
labour market characteristics can be addressed with the model presented in this paper as it features
heterogeneous agents unlike the above cited open economy multi-country/region models 5 Our
model allows us to assess the economic impact of changes in skilled or unskilled retirement age,
in skill-biased technologies, in education levels and in skilled- or unskilled-biased immigration
policies on the U.S. and Europe. Regarding for example the consequences of a prolongation of the
working life on pension systems only the study of Aglietta et al. (2007) investigates this issue.6
However Aglietta et al. (2007) analyse the effects of a prolongation of the working life only for
the European economy and give more attention to its impact on savings, the real exchange rate
and the trade balance. They can moreover not analyse if postponing the retirement age of skilled
individuals has different implications than postponing the one of unskilled individuals. The other
changes in labour market characteristics have not been dealt with in similar models.
Finally this paper is also related to another strand of the literature that analyses the role of
replacement migration in ﬁnancing pension systems. This question has been raised in various
frameworks ranging from a generational accounting methodology (partial equilibrium), to a the-
oretical OLG approach and to a single-country closed-economy CGE model.7 Again applying a
open economy CGE approach can give further insights to this topic by taking into account cap-
ital movements that operate in response to the heterogeneous ageing pattern in the world. To
our knowledge, only two multi-country open economy dynamic CGE models cope with the ﬁscal
consequences of replacement migration. These studies simulate the impact of a doubling of immi-
gration in the economies of developed regions and their results differ. Fehr et al. (2004) ﬁnd that
"increased immigration does very little to mitigate the ﬁscal stress facing the developed world",
whereas Ingenue (2005) conclude that "the ﬁnancing of the pay-as-you-go systems is dramatically
improved" by immigration. Unlike Ingenue (2005) we compare the effects of a selective with a
non-selective immigration policy on the ﬁnancing of pension systems. Unlike Fehr et al. (2004)
we calibrate the regions of origin of the migrants. The modelling of the destination countries is
important in taking into account of the general equilibrium effects induced by the loss of their
(skilled or unskilled) workers by the regions of origin. In addition to these two studies, we exploit
the data available in the World Bank sponsored study of Docquier & Marfouk (2006) to accurately
compute the number of migrants per region of origin.
5Except Fehr et al. (2003, 2004), who distinguish individuals by three income classes, but do not con-
sider the impact of changes in labour market characteristics.
6Also Ingenue (2005), which use an augmented version of the model of Aglietta et al. (2007), analyse
the effects of a postponement of retirement age on pension systems.
7To assess the impact of increased immigrationon public ﬁnances, Bonin et al. (2000)and Collado et al.
(2004) use a general accounting methodology for Germany respectively for Spain, Razin & Sadka (1999)
developa theoreticalOLG modelandStoresletten (2000)appliesa closed-economyCGE modelto calibrate
the US economy.
3Our main result is that the various labour market characteristics have a different impact on
North-American and European pension systems. In the Advanced Countries, postponing retire-
ment age of unskilled individuals by 2 years from 2010 onwards has the most beneﬁcial effect
in reducing the tax-to-GDP ratio (minus 3 to 4% compared to the baseline scenario). In North-
America on the other hand, a linear augmentation in SBTC, from 1% in 2010 to 5% in 2050
compared to the baseline, has the biggest impact in reducing the tax-to-GDP ratio (4 to 4.5% com-
pared to the reference case in the long term). Another result is that an acceleration in skill-biased
technical change has different effects on the economies of North-America and of the Advanced
Countries. It raises per capita GDP in the former and reduces it in the latter. The intuition be-
hind these results is that the proportion of unskilled workers is relatively larger in Europe than
in North-America, raising unskilled retirement age will have a bigger impact in Europe, while
the expansion of skill-biased technologies will enhance the productivity in North-America, where
skill labour is more abundant.
We also ﬁnd that increasing immigration by 25% over the period 2010-2050 has a beneﬁcial
effect on public ﬁnances as long as migrants augment the number of contributors compared to
number of pensioners. When migrants get old, the beneﬁcial effect on pension systems disap-
pears. Moreover there is not much difference in choosing a selective immigration policy (70% of
additional migrants are skilled) or a non-selective policy (30% of additional migrants are skilled)
in order to act against population ageing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 10 regions of the world and
presents the model. The calibration of the baseline scenario is provided in section 3. Section 4
explains the results of the different scenarios. A variant of model, featuring unemployment for
unskilled individuals, is described in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
This study builds upon a 10 region CGE-OLG model developed in Marchiori (2007) and where
individuals live for 8 periods each of 10 years. Age classes go from 15-24 to 85-94 years, implying
that individuals are born at the age of 15 and die at the age of 95. However there is a probability
of being alive at each period, because some individuals are assumed to die before the age of 95.
There are moreover two types of individuals, skilled and unskilled individuals. "Skilled individu-
als" identify individuals with an education above high-school degree (tertiary education), whereas
"unskilled individuals" comprise individuals having an educational level less than high-school
(primary education) and with a high-school degree (secondary education). The educational choice
(e) and thus also the proportion of skilled individuals among one generation (φ) is exogenously
determined.
As in De la Croix & Docquier (2008), we postulate the existence of an insurance mechanism à
la Arrow-Debreu (or à la Yaari 1965). Each time an individual dies, her/his assets will be equally
distributed among individuals belonging to the same age class. In other words, individuals do
not leave any bequests to their children (or to next generations). Furthermore, there is only one
consumption good and its price is the numeraire of the model. There is one leading economy
(North-America), in the sense that the total factor productivity (TFP) of each region is expressed
in terms of the TFP of the leading economy. The leader is always ahead in terms of TFP compared
to the other regions. Besides, the evolution of the TFP is exogenous.
The model introduces skill heterogeneity among individuals. A constant elasticity of substi-
tution (CES) transformation function for efﬁcient labour is used to deﬁne the mix of skilled and
4unskilled labour forces in the production process. Moreover, the model is characterized by full-
employment. Finally, each economy has three agents: households, a representative ﬁrm and a
public sector. In the following subsections, we describe the regional decomposition of the world,
agents’ behaviour and the equilibrium of the model.
2.1 Regions
The model shares the world in 10 regions (or groups of countries). Three of them consist of devel-
oped countries: Japan, North America (NAM), which comprises the United States plus Canada,
and a group of other developed countries with Europe-15 as the major member. This region is la-
belled the ’Advanced Countries’ (ADV), and includes Western European Countries plus Australia
and New-Zealand. The seven other regions are composed of developing countries (more details
can be found in appendix).
2.2 Demography
At each date, some individuals die and a new generation appears. Households reaching age 15 (la-
belled as age 0 in our notations) at year t belong to generation t. The size of the young generation
increases over time at an exogenous growth rate:
N0,t = mt−1N0,t−1, (1)
where N0,t measures the initial size of generation t and mt−1 is one plus the demographic growth
rate, including both fertility and migration. Each household lives a maximum of 8 periods (a =
0,...,7) but faces a cumulative survival probability decreasing with age.8 The size of each gener-
ation declines deterministically through time.
Na,t+a = Pa,t+aN0,t, j = s,u (2)
where 0 ≤ Pa,t+a ≤ 1 is the fraction of generation t alive at age a (hence, at period t + a).




The expected utility function (U) of skilled (upperscript s) and unskilled (upperscript u) individ-








a,t+a), j = s,u (3)
where c
j
a,t+a is the consumption of age class a at time t + a.
The budget constraint of unskilled (u) and skilled (s) individuals requires equality between
the expected value of expenditures and the expected value of income, which consists of labour
8To avoid agent heterogeneity,migrationﬂows are allowed only among individualsof the ﬁrst age class.
Population is calibrated to match the population prospects of the U.N. (2007).










































a,t+a is the labour participation rate for a j type individual of age class a, wt is labour
income, Rt is one plus the interest rate, τc
t is consumption tax, τw





a are other welfare transfers received by an individual of type j and they are
represented as a time-constant fraction of labour income, the generosity factor ψt is the factor by
which these other welfare transfers are multiplied at time t. Education is exogenous and individu-
als spend a fraction e
j
t of their total time (which is only positive in their ﬁrst period of life).
We assume that individuals are born with no assets at time t, or in other words, there are no
bequests. At time t + a with a > 0, assets of skilled and unskilled individuals (Z
j
a,t+a) depend
on their assets in the previous period (Z
j
a,t+a−1) plus an interest rate as well as on current expen-
ditures (consumption) and income (labour income, pension beneﬁts and other welfare transfers).
Formally, at the beginning of their ﬁrst period of life (when a = 0), Z
j
0,t = 0 for all t. For a > 0,


























where Na,t is the number of individuals of age class a living at time t, φ
j
t is the proportion of
individuals of skill type j among generation t.
For a household already living at the initial date, i.e. belonging to the age class a = 1...6 at
















































At each period of time and in each region, a representative ﬁrm uses efﬁcient labour (Lt) and
physical capital (Kt) to produce a composite good (Yt). We assume a Cobb-Douglas production
function with constant returns to scale:
Yt = Kα
t (AtLt)1−α, (7)
6where α measures the share of wage income in the national product, and At is an exogenous
process representing Harrod neutral technological progress.
Total efﬁcient labour force combines the demands9 of skilled (Ls
t) and unskilled labour (Lu
t )
according to a CES transformation function:
Lt = [νt(Ls
t)σ + (1 − νt)(Lu
t )σ]1/σ, (8)
where νt is an exogenous skill-biased technical change (SBTC), σ is deﬁned as σ=1 − 1
ε, with ε
being the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour.
2.5 Government
The government levies taxes on labour earnings (tw
t ) and consumption expenditures (tc
t) to ﬁnance
general public consumption (c
g
t), pension beneﬁts (b
j
t) and other welfare transfers (ζ
j
a+1). The
government surplus (St) can be written as (for j = s,u):
St = τw












































t is a part of national income used to ﬁnance general public spending.
The government also issues bonds and pays interests on public debt. Thus the government’s
budget constraint may be written as:
dt+1Yt+1 = R∗
tdtYt − St, (10)
where d represents the debt-to-GDP ratio, R∗ is one plus the international interest rate and S is the
government’s surplus. Equation (10) says that public debt in t+1 depends on past debt in t and its
interests, minus the government’s surplus S. The government’s budget constraint (10) is satisﬁed
each period by adjusting the wage tax rate. The model’s regions are actually characterized by
different levels of investment risk. Thus a region’s interest rate is equal to the international interest
rate (R∗) plus a risk premium. The risk premia are computed from the OECD (2006a). For
North-America and the Advanced Countries the investment risk is zero and thus their regional
interest rate corresponds to the international one (for country risk calibration see section A.1.2 in
appendix).
Finally, the pension system is modelled in order to allow for different pension systems in each
region. The regional pension systems are partly Bismarckian and Beveridgian depending on the






t + (1 − ρ)wu
t ), (12)
where χt is the replacement rate (0 < χt < 1).
9In the benchmarkmodelthe demandsof efﬁcient labour equal the supplies of efﬁcient labour: Lj = ¯ Lj
for j = s,u. The labour supplies are deﬁned in equation (15).
72.6 Equilibrium
In an economy with perfect capital mobility (up to a risk premium), the aggregate value of world












where X is the set containing each world region. Moreover, Kx
t is the sum of the capital stock of
region x at time t, Ω is the sum of the assets of all the cohorts of region x, dx
t Y x
t is the level of
region x’s debt at time t. An economy with perfect capital mobility is also characterized by the
arbitrage condition of the returns to capital which requires the equality between the rates of return
to capital in each region.
Rx
t = R∗
t(1 + πx) (14)
The domestic interest rate of region x, Rx equals the international interest rate R∗ up to the re-
gion’s risk premium πx (see section A.1.2 in appendix).
Deﬁnition (Competititve Equilibrium) Given an initial stock of capital {Kt}t=0, an exogenous
demographic structure summarized by {Na,t}a=1..7,t≥0, an exogenous distribution of skilled indi-
viduals {φ
j





a,t = 0}a=0,t≥0, a competitive equilibrium of the economy with perfect capital mobility (up to
a risk premium) in each region is
• a vector of individual variables {c
j
a,t}a=0..7,t≥0,j=s,u that are the optimal solutions to the
households’ maximization problem, i.e. equation (3) subject to (4);
• a vector of individual variables {c
j
a,t}a=1..7,t=0..7−a,j=s,u such that utility (3) of the ﬁrst old
generations is maximized subject to (6);
• a vector of the ﬁrm’s variables {Kt,L
j
t}t≥0,j=s,u that maximise the ﬁrm’s proﬁts subject to
technology (7);
• a vector of income taxes {τw
t } balancing the budget of the government (10);
• a vector of wages {w
j
t}t≥0,j=s,u such that the labour markets are in equilibrium ;
• an interest factor {Rt}t≥0 satisfying the no arbitrage condition of the rates of return to
capital, i.e. equation (14) holds;
• and ﬁnally, an international interest factor R∗
t satisfying the equality between the aggregate
value of world assets and the market value of the world-wide capital stock plus the sum of
the debts of all regions, i.e. equation (13) holds.
3 Calibration of the baseline scenario
In this section we explain the calibration of the parameters as well as of the observed and un-
observed exogenous variables. We also deﬁne the baseline scenario and the assumptions on the
8future. Finally we focus on the different scenarios characterised by changes in the retirement age,
skill-biased technical progress and education levels.
The model is calibrated in such a way that it matches regional structures and world disparities
over the period 1950-2000. We start from an initial steady-state in 1870 and we focus on the
transitional path of the world economy until it reaches the ﬁnal steady-state in 2200. Our period
of interest is 2000-2100.
3.1 Parameters and exogenous variables
Parameters are set a priori and are identical in all the regions. The capital share in output α equals
to 0.33. We follow Acemoglu (2002) in ﬁxing the elasticity of substitution ε to 1.4 and thus the
parameter in the CES labour demand function, σ, which corresponds to 1 − 1
ε equals 0.2857.
Observed exogenous variables comprise public debt dt, among generation t the share of
skilled individuals φt, the population growth rate mt and the probability of being alive Pa,t+a.
Public debt dt is computed from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI, 2006), except the
public debt of the Advanced Countries and Japan, which are obtained from the OECD (2006b). To
compute the share of skilled individuals among one generation φt, we use the Barro & Lee (2001)
dataset, which gives the share of skilled individuals aged 25 to 74 for the years 1950 to 2000. We
compute the probability for an individual of generation t of being alive at time t + a, Pa,t+a, and
the population growth rate mt from the population prospects of the U.N. (2007).
Unobserved exogenous variables include total factor productivity At, the growth rate of the
leading economy gt and skill-biased technical change νt. To obtain technical progress At, we use
the GDP ratio (Yt/Y ∗
t ), where Y ∗
t is the leader’s GDP. We proceed as in De la Croix & Docquier
(2008), who use a backsolving identiﬁcation method to calibrate technical progress. It consists
in swapping the exogenous variables At for the endogenous variables Yt/Y ∗
t and then solving
the identiﬁcation step with the Dynare algorithm Juillard (1996). We do the same for skill-biased
technical change νt by the using full-employment wage differential, ht (= ¯ ws
t/ ¯ wu
t ), where ¯ w is
full-employment wage. The ratio of GDP’s is computed by employing the data of the GDP per
purchasing power parity from the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI, 2006) for the three
years 1980, 1990 and 2000.10 We hold the value of 1980 (respectively 2000) constant for the
years preceding 1980 (respectively following 2000). The skill premium ht is ﬁxed at 2.3 for the
Advanced Countries and 3 for North-America for the year 2000 and depicts the fact that skill
premium is higher in the US than in Europe. These two values reﬂect the pattern of the US college
wage premium in Acemoglu (2003) during the period 1950-2000. Finally, the technical progress
growth of the leader, gt=A∗
t+1/A∗
t, where A∗ is the leader’s technical progress, is calibrated on
observations. The growth rate of the North-American technical progress is calibrated to 1.2, which
means that the annual growth rate is equal to 1.84%. The calibration of a region x’s risk premium
πx is explained in section A.1.2 of the appendix.
3.2 Baseline and assumptions on the future
In the baseline scenario, the distance of the technical progress of each region to the technical
progress of the leading economy is assumed to be constant after 2000 (except for three developing
10We take the 5-year average value for the three time periods 1980, 1990 and 2000: 1978-1982, 1988-
1992 and 1998-2002.
9regions of the model, see appendix). Furthermore, like the policies conducted in many developing
countries, the baseline already features less generous pension systems in the near future because
of population ageing, e.g. a postponement by 1 year of the retirement age of skilled and unskilled
individuals between 2000 and 2050 (see appendix). In addition, we hold the proportion of skilled
individuals among each new generation constant from 2000 onwards.
3.3 Scenarios on labour market characteristics
Table 1 presents the "realistic" changes in the various labour market characteristics with the bench-
mark model. Five scenarios are considered for North-America and six for the Advanced Countries.
In the ﬁrst scenario, retirement age of unskilled individuals is postponed by two years beyond the
baseline level from 2010 onwards both in the Advanced Countries and in North-America. In a
second simulation, the same scenario is run for the retirement age of skilled individuals. In sce-
nario three the ﬁrms augment their demand for skilled labour in the production process scenario
during the ﬁrst half of the 21st century. This scenario is characterized by a continuous accelera-
tion in skill-biased technical change with respect to the baseline from 2010 to 2050: from a 1%
augmentation in 2010 to reach a 5% increment in 2050 compared to the baseline.11
In simulation four we assume that the proportion of educated individuals rises during the ﬁrst
half of the 21st century, but only in the Advanced Countries. The proportion of young educated
people augments steadily from 2 percentage points in 2010 to 10 percentage points in 2050 with
respect to the baseline scenario. There will be no scenario of increased supply of skills in North-
America, because according to Cheeseman Day and Bauman (2000) the proportion of skilled
among young skilled individuals may not vary much in the near future in the US. Finally, we con-
sider two policies of increased immigration. We track migration ﬂows from the seven developing
regions to North-America and the Advanced Countries.12 To avoid additional agent heterogeneity,
we also assume that migrants enter at the age of 15 when they have no assets (the integration of
migration ﬂows in the model is explained more in detail in appendix). In the two immigration sce-
narios, 25% of additional immigrants (compared to the baseline scenario) arrive to North-America
and to the Advanced Countries between 2010 and 2050. When the non-selective immigration
policy (scenario 5) is applied, 30% of these additional migrants are skilled and 70% unskilled
whereas 70% of these migrants are skilled and 30% unskilled in the selective immigration policy
(scenario 6). Table 1 shows how the proportion of young skilled individuals in the population
changes according to these two policies.
The evolution of the parameters in the different scenarios can be justiﬁed in the following way.
We argue that a prolongation of the working life can be implemented immediately via a public pol-
icy and thus the total augmentation in legal retirement age happens in one period. In the scenarios
3 and 4 the changes are progressive (and occur over several periods), because the proportion of
skilled in a population and skill-biased technical change may not be radically inﬂuenced over a
short time period.
Moreover, instead of simulating two radical policies of increased immigration (e.g. an arrival
of 100% of unskilled versus 100% of skilled immigrants), we prefer to compare the effects of two
more "realistic" immigration policies: 70% of skilled / 30% of unskilled versus 30% of skilled /
11The values of all exogenous variables are ﬁxed after 2050 in each scenario, expect for νt, which con-
tinues to vary slightly from 2050 to 2100 in the baseline case.
12We do not quantify migration ﬂows from the North (developed regions) to the South (developing re-
gions) as well as North-North and South-South migrations, but they are implicitly taken into account in the
UN Population data.
1070% of unskilled migrants. We argue that when a country chooses to adopt a selective immigration
policy, it can never "attract" 100% of skilled migrants, because a migrant may for example arrive
with his family members, who are probably not all highly skilled.
Table 1: Simulations for the Advanced Countries and North-America
Scenario 1: Postponement of unskilled retirement age (+2 years in 2010)
Both regions 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Baseline 60 60.2 60.4 60.6 60.8 61
Scenario 1 60 62.2 62.4 62.6 62.8 63
Scenario 2: Postponement of skilled retirement age (+2 years in 2010)
Both regions 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Baseline 62 62.2 62.4 62.6 62.8 63
Scenario 2 62 64.2 64.4 64.6 64.8 65
Scenario 3: Rise in SBTC (ν) by 1% in 2010 to 5% in 2050
Region and Scenario 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
ADV: Baseline 48.1% 51.8% 54.2% 55.3% 55.5% 55.5%
ADV: Scenario 3 48.1% 52.4% 55.3% 57% 57.8% 58.2%
NAM: Baseline 73.3% 75.3% 76.2% 76.7% 76.9% 76.9%
NAM: Scenario 3 73.3% 76% 77.8% 79% 80% 80.8%
Scenario 4: Increase in the share of young skilled (φ) from 2pp in 2010 to 10pp in 2050
Region and Scenario 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
ADV: Baseline 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
ADV: Scenario 4 30% 32% 34% 36% 38% 40%
NAM: Baseline 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55%
NAM: No Scenario 4 —– —– —– —– —– —–
Scenario 5 and 6: Share of young skilled (φ) when the inﬂow of migrants increases by 25%
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
ADV: Baseline 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
ADV: Scenario 5: Non-selective immigration 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
ADV: Scenario 6: Selective immigration 30% 30.78% 30.82% 30.85% 30.86% 30.87%
NAM: Baseline 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55%
NAM: Scenario 5: Non-selective immigration 55% 53.98% 54.04% 54.08% 54.11% 54.15%
NAM: Scenario 6: Selective immigration 55% 55.61% 55.58% 55.55% 55.53% 55.51%
φ is the proportion of skilled among individuals aged 15-24, ν is skill-biased technological change
Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2006) for scenarios 5 & 6 and own computations; own calibration for scenarios 1-4.
Table 2: Labour force increase under retirement age and immigration scenarios
Increase in the labor force compared to the BSL
Advanced Countries 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090 2110
Scenario 1: postponement of RA-U 0.73% 1.51% 1.47% 1.36% 1.36% 1.36%
Scenario 2: postponement of RA-S 3.60% 3.91% 3.43% 3.17% 3.18% 3.18%
Scenario 5: increase in Immi-U 0.13% 1.02% 2.59% 3.40% 3.40% 3.23%
Scenario 6: increase in Immi-S 0.25% 1.73% 4.71% 7.09% 7.92% 7.92%
North-America 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090 2110
Scenario 1: postponement of RA-U 1.94% 2.19% 2.49% 2.47% 2.53% 2.53%
Scenario 2: postponement of RA-S 2.20% 1.98% 2.03% 2.02% 2.07% 2.07%
Scenario 5: increase in Immi-U 0.33% 2.83% 7.02% 10.24% 11.30% 11.19%
Scenario 6: increase in Immi-S 0.67% 3.33% 7.16% 9.33% 9.77% 9.63%
RA-S and RA-U stand for retirement age of skilled respectively unskilled individuals, while Immi-U and Immi-S represent increased
unskilled respectively skilled immigration. Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2006) and own calculations
Besides, unlike Ingenue (2005) and Fehr et al. (2004) who double immigration ﬂows to send-
ing countries/regions, the immigration scenarios presented here do only augment by 25% the mi-
11grants coming to the Advanced Countries and to North-America. The reason is that we prefer
to follow again the aim of more "realistic" changes on the labour supply. Table 2 shows how a
prolongation (of two years) in the working life of unskilled or skilled individuals and an increase
(by 25%) in skilled or unskilled migration inﬂows affects the labour supply compared to the base-
line. The rise in the labour supply (compared to the baseline) due to a postponement of the legal
retirement age is obviously relatively constant (because it is a one-time change in labour supply),
while immigration constantly increases the labour supply as additional migrants arrive each period
to their destination region until 2050. We see that the increase in the labour force due to any of the
two immigration policies is more than two (four) times higher than the increase in the labour sup-
ply due to a prolongation of the working life in the Advanced Countries (North-America). Thus
doubling immigration would have an excessive effect on the labour supply.
4 Results
In this section we present the effects of the different potential remedies on the tax-to-GDP ratio
and on per capita GDP of the Advanced Countries and of North-America. First, we investigate if
any of the scenarios can mitigate the old age crises, by helping to ﬁnance pension systems. But
we will also analyse their implications for per capita GDP, as they are likely to have an impact on
the economic performance of these two regions.
4.1 Public Finance
Figure 1 displays the effect of the different policy changes on the tax-to-GDP ratio with respect to
the baseline.13 In the Advanced Countries, postponing retirement age of unskilled individuals is
the most effective one among all the scenarios in reducing the ﬁscal pressure. In the ﬁrst quarter
of the 21st century the tax-to-GDP ratio drops very rapidly, by 3.4% already in 2010 compared
to the baseline. The reduction in the tax-to-GDP ratio stabilizes at 3% in the long run. When
postponing the retirement age of skilled individuals, the tax-to-GDP ratio decreases only slowly
in the beginning of the 21st century and the cut is around 2% in the long term (with respect to the
baseline).
The stronger impact on the tax-to-GDP ratio due to postponing unskilled retirement age is due
to the fact that the majority of the labour force is unskilled in the Advanced Countries. Because
the share of skilled individuals increases over the ﬁrst half of the 21st century14, the difference in
the reduction of the tax-to-GDP ratio due to the effects of both scenarios is lower. When unskilled
retirement age is delayed, the decline in the tax-to-GDP ratio lessens slightly between 2030 and
2050, whereas a higher retirement age for skilled individuals decreases taxes constantly over the
2000-2050 period. An acceleration in skill-biased technological change reduces taxes by 1.2% in
the long term (compared to the baseline). Moreover, a rise in the proportion of skilled individuals
has a very negligible impact on taxes.
In North-America, an acceleration in skill-biased technical change reduces the tax-to-GDP
13The tax-to-GDP is the ratio of the sum of income taxes times wages and consumption taxes times
consumption of a region to the GDP of the region.
14The share of skilled among a new born generation is 24% in 1980. 27.8% in 1990 and 30% from 2000
onwards. Thus the share of skilled in the total populationrises steadily in the 21st centuryand tends to 30%
in the long run.
12Figure 1: Tax-to-GDP ratio with respect to the baseline
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BSL is the baseline, RA-S and RA-U stand for the scenarios of postponement in retirement age of skilled respectively unskilled
individuals, SBTC and EDU are respectively the scenarios in which skill-biased technical change and education levels increase,
Immi-U and Immi-S represent increased unskilled respectively skilled immigration.
ratio more than postponing retirement age of any type of workers. The decrease in the tax-to-GDP
ratio corresponds to 4.4% in the long run (compared to the baseline) and to less than 1.2% in
the Advanced Countries. Postponing skilled retirement age has a slightly stronger effect in the
reduction of the tax-to-GDP ratio than delaying unskilled retirement age. In North-America, the
proportion of skilled leans to 55% in the long term.15 Skilled and unskilled individuals are thus
more equally distributed in the population than in the Advanced Countries. This explains that
there is less difference in opting for longer working time of skilled instead of unskilled workers to
reduce the tax-to-GDP ratio than in the Advanced Countries.
Finally, the effect of immigration in ﬁnancing pension systems is quite strong compared to
the other potential "remedies". In both regions it is highest in the middle of the century, but the
beneﬁcial effect on taxes disappears by the end of the century. The more realistic policy change
of increasing immigration by 25% rather than doubling migration inﬂows reduces ﬁscal pressure
by around 3-3.5% in the Advanced Countries and by 4.5-5.5% in North-America. If the migra-
tion ﬂows in our migration policies would be doubled compared to the baseline, our results would
contrast with the ﬁndings of Fehr et al. (2004) and conﬁrm the conclusion of Ingenue (2005):
increased immigration alleviates the future ﬁscal burden associated to the ageing of the popula-
tion in the developed world. Interestingly, our ﬁndings also support the results of the two-period
theoretical OLG model of Razin & Sadka (1999), in which individuals work in the ﬁrst period
of their life and are retired in the second period. Razin & Sadka (1999) ﬁnd that an immigration
policy is beneﬁcial to the pension systems of the receiving countries in the period of the migrants’
arrival, as they increase the labour force. We also ﬁnd that the positive effects of immigration last
until the immigrants retire. In addition, because our individuals live for eight periods, the beneﬁ-
cial effects of immigration hold several periods after the stop of the increased immigration policy.
Even though the labour force remains higher than in the baseline in the long run, the number of
15In 1980, 50% of the 15 to 24 years old are skilled. In 1990, there are 52.5% of skilled among the same
age group and 55% from 2000 onwards.
13pensioners beneﬁting from contributions will also be higher. Furthermore, in ?, also low-skilled
immigrants may contribute to ﬁnance the pension systems of developed countries. This corrobo-
rates with our result, but differs from the outcome of the study of Storesletten (2000) , who argues
that only selective immigration policies may be used to reduce the ﬁscal pressure on the welfare
state.
The surprising result is that the two immigration policies seem to have a quite similar impact
on taxes.16 A selective policy relieves the ﬁscal pressure by 14.6% respectively by 12.91% more
than a non-selective one in North-America respectively in the Advanced Countries.17 The rea-
sons why the two immigration policies create a similar effect on taxes may be twofold: - First,
the deﬁnition of unskilled individuals does not include only "low-skilled" individuals (who have
less than a high-school degree), but also "medium-skilled" individuals (who have a high-school
degree). Medium-skilled immigrants are important contributors to the welfare state. - Secondly,
the skill-composition of our immigration policies is not a "radical" one, in the sense that Policy A
is not composed of 100% of unskilled migrants and Policy B not of 100% of skilled migrants. In
the case of a comparison between the effects of "extreme" immigration policies, the difference in
the reduction of taxes is more clear-cut (see ﬁgure 6 in appendix).
4.2 Income per capita
In the Advanced Countries, a progressive increase in the share of skilled individuals, up to a level
of 40% in 2050, is the scenario that leads to the highest long term increase in per capita GDP of
7% with respect to the baseline scenario (ﬁgure 2). Postponing retirement age of either skilled or
unskilled individuals increases per capita GDP by less than 2.5% compared to the reference case
in the long run.
Higher skill-biased technical change leads to a long term decrease in per capita GDP of almost
2.5% compared to the baseline. In North-America, a delay in the retirement age of skilled indi-
viduals produces the most important increase in per capita GDP among all the scenarios: a 3.5%
rise by the end of the 21st century compared to the reference case. Higher skill-biased technical
change and a delayed unskilled retirement age increase per capita GDP by around 1%.
Wenotice thatanincrease inskill-biased technical change hasdifferent effects ontheeconomies
of North-America and of the Advanced Countries. It increases per capita GDP in the former and
decreases it in the latter. This is closely linked to the different education levels in both regions and
can be interpreted as follows. A high supply in the skilled labour force induces North-American
ﬁrms to apply more advanced technologies in the production process Acemoglu (2002, 2003).
Following a reasoning à la Nelson & Phelps (1966) or à la Benhabib & Spiegel (2005) where a
follower imitates the technology of the leader economy, we can argue that the skill-complementary
technologies developed in North-America are adopted by the Advanced Countries. Because of
lower education levels, the production process in the Advanced Countries is not adapted to use
the new technologies. They create unemployment, increase the skill premium (see ﬁgures 7 and
10 in appendix) and increase per capita income gap between North-America and the Advanced
Countries.
16When simulating the two immigration policies, general public consumption (c
g
tYt) is the same in the
two scenarios of increased immigration. The government spends more public goods when additional mi-
grants arrive (because Yt will rise when the labour force increases). However, general public expenditure
does not change if the composition of these migrants is different.
17A non-selective (selective) immigration policy decreases the tax-to-GDP ratio by 2.8% (3.2%) in the
Advanced Countries and by 4.7% (5.3%) in North-America.
14Figure 2: Per capita GDP with respect to the baseline
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BSL is the baseline, RA-S and RA-U stand for the scenarios of postponement in retirement age of skilled respectively unskilled
individuals, SBTC and EDU are respectively the scenarios in which skill-biased technical change and education levels increase,
Immi-U and Immi-S represent increased unskilled respectively skilled immigration.
Immigration has a beneﬁcial impact on per capita GDP but again only as long as the labour
force is increased and as long as the number of pensioners does not increase (by too much). In
2050, the increase in per capita GDP is by 51% higher in the Advanced Countries and by 111%
in North-America with a selective immigration than with a non-selective immigration policy. The
fact that skill-complementary production process is more important in North-America (higher ν)
can explain that a selective immigration policy has a more beneﬁcial effect in North-America.
5 Unemployment variant
In this section we introduce a variant of the model, characterized by a non-competitive labour
market of unskilled individuals and thus featuring unskilled unemployment. Formally, the fun-
damental difference with the benchmark model is the introduction of an equation determining
exogenously the wage of unskilled workers.
5.1 Modelling wage rigidities
In the new framework, we have to distinguish between demand and supply of labour. Let skilled
and unskilled efﬁcient labour supplies ¯ Ls
t and ¯ Lu











a,t, j = s,u (15)
where φ
j
t is the proportion of individuals of type j among generation t.18
18φs
t is equal to φt and φu
t is equal to 1 − φt.
15The non-walrassian unskilled wage wu
t is modelled as a linear combination between the com-
petitive unskilled wage ¯ wu
t (which is equal to the marginal productivity of unskilled labour under




t + (1 − ηt) ¯ wu
t , (16)
where η is a mark-up to the competitive unskilled wage (0 ≤ ηt ≤ 1). A positive η implies that the
supply of unskilled labour is higher than the demand (¯ Lu
t > Lu
t ), which leads to unemployment.




There is however full-employment of skilled labour: ¯ Ls
t = Ls
t.
The non-walrassian wage for unskilled individuals introduced here does not rely on any union
maximisation problem. However, equation (16) implies a trade-off between unemployment and
higher wages for unskilled workers. A higher η implies a higher wage for unskilled individuals
than under a competitive labour market, but also an higher unemployment rate.
Finally, equations (11) and (12) determining the pension beneﬁts for skilled and unskilled
workers write now as follows:
bu




t + (1 − ρ)(1 − ut)wu
t ), (19)
where χt is the replacement rate (0 ≤ χt ≤ 1).
5.2 Calibration and scenarios
To calibrate the mark-up of the unskilled wage to its level under full-employment, ηt, we apply the
same methodology as for total factor productivity and for skill-biased technological change. We
usethe unemployment rate, ut, todetermine ηt via the backsolving identiﬁcation method described
above. To build the unskilled unemployment rate for the years 1980-2000, we use the share of
unemployed individuals with primary and secondary education in total unemployment from the
WDI database.20 For the years before 1980, we make the unskilled unemployment rate at time
t − 1 be equal to 80% of that at time t. In 2050, we assume that the unemployment rate reaches a
level equal to 75% of that in 2000 (during the period 2000-2050, it decreases every 10 years by 5%
compared to 2000). After 2050, the unemployment rate is constant. Following these assumptions,
the unemployment rate in the Advanced Countries and North-America, is respectively 8.54% and
4.28% in 2000 and reaches respectively 6.74% and 3.21% in 2050.
The "unemployment" variant introduces an additional scenario with respect to the benchmark
model: the wage of unskilled workers is rendered more competitive. In the Advanced Countries
the mark-up to the competitive unskilled wage ηt is cut by half from 2010 onwards. On the other
hand, we consider that in North-America, ηt is already at a very low value in the baseline and thus
no additional simulation is considered on ηt.
19The effective skilled wage is higher than the skilled wage under full-employment of unskilled labour
ws
t > ¯ ws
t, where ws
t = MPLs(Lu), ¯ ws
t = MPLs(¯ Lu) and MPLs is marginal productivity of skilled
labour.
20except for Sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian world, for which, we start from the gross unemployment
rate for the year 2000 given by the CIA world factbook.
165.3 Results
The results delivered by scenarios 1 to 6 with the benchmark model (see section 4) are very robust
under the variant of the model (see ﬁgures 8 and 9 in appendix). Additionally we see that a more
competitive labour market in the Advanced Countries does neither have a big impact on the ﬁscal
policy nor on the region’s economic performance. A cut of 50% in the mark-up η from 2010
onwards decreases the tax-to-GDP ratio by 0.66% and raises per capita GDP by 1.7% compared
to the baseline.
Figure 3 depicts how unemployment is affected under the different scenarios. In both regions,
a delay in the retirement age has a similar impact on unemployment: postponing retirement age by
two years of unskilled (skilled) individuals raises (cuts) unemployment by 5.5% in the Advanced
Countries and by 4.9% in North-America, with respect to the baseline. A rise in skill-biased tech-
nical change creates higher unemployment in both regions, but especially in North America, with
an increase of 34%, with respect to the baseline, while in the Advanced Countries unemployment
augments by 17%.
Moreover, in the Advanced Countries, raising the proportion of skilled individuals from 30%
to 40% has the same long term effects than cutting the wage mark-up by half. In both cases,
unemployment is reduced by almost 50% compared to the baseline at the end of the 21st century.
A non-selective (selective) immigration policy will increase (decrease) unemployment by less than
1% (by less than 4%) in the Advanced Countries and by more than 5% (by little more than 1%) in
North-America compared to the baseline.
Figure 3: Unemployment rate with respect to the baseline
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BSL is the baseline, RA-S and RA-U stand for the scenarios of postponement in retirement age of skilled respectively unskilled
individuals, SBTC and EDU are respectively the scenarios in which skill-biased technical change and education levels increase,
Immi-U and Immi-S represent increased unskilled respectively skilled immigration. CW is the additional scenario under the variant
model, in which the unskilled labour market is more competitive.
176 Conclusion
Finally, we conclude that the ﬁscal pressure on pension systems cannot be considerably relieved
under none of the above mentioned realistic scenarios (in terms of the size of the changes in
labour market characteristics). They should, at most, be considered as a solution together with
other policies that act for example upon pension beneﬁts and contributions to the social security
system. Moreover, relying upon our ﬁndings, in both regions, postponing skilled retirement age
would be the most adequate of the above mentioned measures. In the Advanced Countries, this
proposal reduces the tax-to-GDP ratio by little less than an increase in unskilled retirement age
and both have a similar impact on per capita GDP, but a higher retirement age for skilled workers
does not raise unemployment. In North-America, the reduction in the tax-to-GDP ratio due to a
higher retirement age for skilled individuals is half as much than the one by a rise in skill-biased
technical change. However, a rise in skill-biased technical change has a less important impact on
per capita GDP and increases considerably unemployment.
It can be argued that what explains the different effects of these changes in North-America and
in Europe is the fact the European labour market is less competitive than the American one. Thus
in a variant of the model we introduce wage rigidities in the labour market of unskilled workers,
which creates unemployment. The results obtained in the benchmark model are quite robust under
this new speciﬁcation of the model and we cannot conclude that the difference in the effects of
changes in labour market characteristics on pension systems between North-America and Europe
are due to non-competitive European labour markets. In this alternative speciﬁcation of the model
we also show that, under an additional scenario, that a reduction the mark-up of the unskilled wage
to its competitive level by half has only a negligible contribution in ﬁnancing pension systems in
the Advanced Countries.
If a choice would have to be made among the above mentioned measures, postponing skilled
retirement age would be the most adequate in both regions. In the Advanced Countries, this pro-
posal is less effective in reducing the tax-to-GDP ratio than an increase in unskilled retirement age
and both have a similar impact on per capita GDP. A higher retirement age for unskilled workers
would however raise unemployment. In North-America, a rise in skill-biased technical change re-
duces the tax-to-GDP ratio more than ahigher retirement age for skilled individuals, but the former
one has a less beneﬁcial effect on per capita GDP and increases signiﬁcantly unemployment.
Several extensions may undoubtedly enrich the model. It would be interesting to see what
would be the effects of such scenarios on developing regions. Besides, endogenizing the educa-
tional choice (i.e. the time spent in education) of the individuals and the labour supply would
improve the quality of the model. This last extension would allow us to have a framework where
individuals choose when they want to retire. These issues are left for future research.
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There are 10 regions in our model, of which the ﬁrst three are composed of developed countries
and the seven others of developing countries.
1. North America (NAM): United States and Canada.
2. Advanced Countries (ADV):Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
3. Japan (JAP): Japan.
4. Eastern Europe (EAS): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Re-
public, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and
Montenegro, Slovakia and Slovenia.
5. Middle East and North Africa (MEN): Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran (Islamic
Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Mo-
rocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic,
Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
6. Latin America and Caribbean (LAC): Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago,
Uruguay and Venezuela.
7. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA):Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo Democratic Repub-
lic, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Maurita-
nia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
8. Former Soviet Union (RUS): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
9. Chinese world (CHI): Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China, East Timor, Hong Kong, Korea,
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Macau, Mongolia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand
and VietNam.
10. Indian world and Paciﬁc Islands (IND): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Federated
States of Micronesia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tonga and Vanuatu.
21A.1.2 Government
In each region, investors face some investment risk and are compensated by a premium on the
international rate of return to capital R∗. The riskier the region, the higher the premium. The risk




where q is the risk classiﬁcation of a region as deﬁned by the OECD (2006a), qo is the highest
attainable risk rating and πo is the maximum risk premium. This means that in a region with a risk
rating close to the maximum qo an investor will receive a premium close to the highest possible
risk premium πo.
The risk premium π is modelled here as a government tax on investment. In a risky region,
a part of an investor’s return to capital is levied by the government, who uses it in general public
spending. This share of returns to capital taken by the government is exactly equal to the risk
premium. A high tax on capital reﬂects a high region risk.
We use data available from the OECD (2006a) for region speciﬁc risk q which rely upon the
Knaepen Package methodology. The Knaepen Package is a system for assessing country credit
risk and classiﬁes countries into eight country risk categories (0 - 7), from no risk (0) to high risk
(7). It basically measures the country credit risk, i.e. the likelihood that a country will service its
external debt. To compute the risk classiﬁcation per region, we take an arithmetic mean of ratings
of the available countries. For the Advanced Countries, North-America and Japan the risk is nil, it
corresponds to 3,4 for the Eastern Countries, to 3,95 for the Mediterranean World, 5,19 for Latin
America, to 6,40 for Sub-Saharan Africa, to 6,17 for the Russian World, 3,18 for the Chinese
World and to 4,89 for the Indian World.
A.1.3 Equilibrium conditions
Maximizing utility (3) under the households budget constraint (4) w.r.t. the levels of consumption





a,t+a, j = s,u (21)
The proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms requires the equality of the marginal productivity of each factor
to its rate of return:
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t (AtLt)1−α − δ = Rt, (23)
where δ represents the depreciation rate of capital.
A.2 Support ratio and immigration
Figure 4 depicts the support ratio (number of people of working age for one pensioner) in the
Advanced Countries and in North-America over the 21st century. The ageing process is stronger
in the former region than in the latter one.
22Figure 4: Support ratios in North-America and in the Advanced Countries











Throughout the paper, migration refers to migrants from the developing regions going or living
in the North. In order to calibrate these migration stocks and ﬂows for the baseline, we explic-
itly track migrants from the seven developing regions into the North-America and the Advanced
Countries. North-to-North and South-to-South migrants are implicitly dealt with through the U.N.
population data and forecasts. To introduce migration ﬂows in the model, we make 3 assumptions.
First, migrants are directly assimilated to natives, i.e. they acquire the same characteristics (e.g.
productivity) as natives as soon as they enter the destination region. A second assumption is that
there is no return migration. Finally, all the migrants arrive at the age of 15 (i.e. without any
assets).21
Each of these two receiving regions experiences two different policies of increased immigra-
tion between 2010 and 2050. Instead of simulating two radical policies of increased immigration
(e.g. an arrival of 100% of unskilled versus 100% of skilled immigrants), we prefer to compare
the effects of two more "realistic" immigration policies: 70% of skilled / 30% of unskilled versus
30% of skilled / 70% of unskilled migrants. We argue that when a country chooses to adopt a
selective immigration policy, it can never "attract" 100% of skilled migrants, because for example
a migrant may arrive with his family members, who are probably not highly skilled.
In the following step we need to determine the "additional" number of migrants arriving to
North-America and to the Advanced Countries between 2010 and 2050. According to the pro-
jections of the U.N. Population Division, 64’375 respectively 39’104 thousands of migrants will
arrive to North-America respectively to the Advanced Countries between 2010 and 2050. From
this number we subtract the number of 0 to 14 years old migrants. In the United States, 8% of
the immigrants are aged between 0 to 14 years (U.S. Census Bureau). We apply this share also to
the migrants of the Advanced Countries. Next, we only want to consider migrants from the seven
developing to North-America and the Advanced Countries. Thus we subtract from the migrants
aged 15 and more, all the migrants coming from the countries belonging to these two developed
21These assumptions are necessary in order not to increase the heterogeneity of agents in the model,
which would further complicate the computation of the transitory path. In fact, in our model we have in-
dividuals with 2 different educational attainments of 8 different age classes and belonging to 10 different
regions. If there was for example return migration in the model (no permanent immigration), migrants
would go back to their region(s) of origin after some periods with different characteristics than the individ-
uals that did not emigrate fromtheir homeregion. Agent heterogeneityin the region(s)of origin would then
increase. For the same reason we have to assume that migrants arrive at the age of 15 years. When migrants
arrive later, they will come with different characteristics than natives and the heterogeneity of households
in the destination country will also change.
23regions and from Japan. Using the data available in the World Bank sponsored study of Doc-
quier & Marfouk (2006), we obtain that 79.02% respectively 58.44% of the total immigrants in
NAM respectively ADV come from the 7 developing regions in 2000. We assume that in the
periods following 2000 the share of migrants coming from the seven developing regions will be
more and more important in NAM and ADV. We assume that the share of migrants coming from
the seven developing regions will increase progressively from 79.02% in 2000 to 85% in 2050
in North-America and from 58.44% to 70.13% in the Advanced Countries.22 To determine from
which developing region the additional migrants will arrive we assume that they will be split up
according to the region of origin of the 2000 stock of migrants in North-America and in the Ad-
vanced Countries again by making use of the data available in the World Bank sponsored study
of Docquier & Marfouk (2006). Table 3 indicates that the additional migrants to North-America
and the Advanced Countries have quite different origins. While most of the additional migrants
to North-America originate from Latin America and the Caribbean (54%) and from the Chinese
World (22%), the Advanced Countries experience most of their additional immigration from the
Middle East and North Africa (33%) and from the Eastern European Countries (22%).
Table 3: Additional Migrants to NAM and ADV by region of origin
Source region EAS MEN LAC JAP SSA RUS CHI IND
Host region
NAM 6.19% 5.03% 53.58% 0% 2.81% 2.97% 21.76% 7.66%
ADV 21.61% 33.10% 8.86% 0% 11.19% 2.90% 9.68% 12.66%
Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2006) and own calculations
Table 4 shows the evolution in the proportion of international migrants under different scenar-
ios. The share of immigrants is much higher in North-America than in the Advanced Countries.
When migration inﬂows are increased by 25%, there are around 2.5% more migrants in North-
America and almost 1.5% in the Advanced Countries in 2050.
Table 4: International migrants as a proportion of the population
Region and scenario 2010 2030 2050 2070 2090 2110 2130
ADV: Baseline 6.15% 7.36% 8.33% 9.07% 9.50% 9.66% 9.67%
ADV: +25% of migrants 6.43% 8.15% 9.67% 10.43% 10.44% 10.01% 9.67%
NAM: Baseline 12.39% 14.38% 15.68% 16.41% 16.48% 16.45% 16.45%
NAM: +25% of migrants 13.11% 16.07% 18.21% 18.70% 17.97% 16.99% 16.45%
Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2006) and own calculations
A.3 Baseline scenario
In the baseline scenario, the distance of the TFP of each region to the TFP of the leading economy
is assumed to be constant after 2000, except for three developing regions of the model: the Eastern
Countries, the Chinese World and the Indian World. In line with the recent accession of the
majority of Eastern European countries to the European Union and with the last years’ increased
22The value of 85% for North-America is ﬁxed arbitrarily and 70.13% corresponds to an arbitrary 20%
increase in the value of 2000.
24growth pace of India and China, we assume that these three regions will experience a TFP catch-
up with the leader over the 21st century. The Eastern Countries will have increased their TFP
compared to the leader’s TFPby 25% in 2100. Moreover, wefollow Ingenue (2005) in considering
that both the Chinese and Indian regions will have doubled their TFP compared to the leader’s TFP
by 2100.
Furthermore, like the policies conducted in many developing countries, we consider that pen-
sion systems will be less generous in the near future because of population ageing. Because we
anticipate such pensions reforms in the near future, we provide two changes in our initial assump-
tions concerning the pension systems over the ﬁrst half of the 21st century in our baseline scenario.
First, between 2000 and 2040, the age of retirement is gradually increased by one year for both
unskilled and skilled individuals. More formally, for the age group 55-64, λu (respectively λs)
passes steadily from 0.5 to 0.6 (respectively from 0.7 to 0.8) over the period 2000-2040 in Japan,
the Advanced Countries and North-America. Second, between 2000 and 2050, the replacement
rate, χt, decreases in developed regions: from 41.5% to 36% in North-America, from 42.5% to
37% in the Advanced Countries and from 27.5% to 22% in Japan.
A.4 Evolution of the tax-to-GDP ratio
Figure 5: Tax-to-GDP ratio under the baseline scenario











Figure 5 shows the evolution of the tax-to-GDP ratio in the Advanced Countries and in North-
America. In both regions, the evolution of the tax-to-GDP ratio is strongly inﬂuenced by the
speciﬁc ageing path of their populations (cf. appendix for the evolution of the support ratio of
these two regions during the 21st century). The Advanced Countries experience a rapid rise in
the tax-to-GDP ratio between 2000 and 2050 (from 41.2% to 50.9%). After 2050, they decrease
steadily to attain a stable value of 45% in the 22nd century. Typically, the long-run "structural"
increase from 41.2% to 50.9% is related to the trends in mortality and fertility rates. The short-run
transitory overshooting bump is due to the timing of fertility and mortality changes (especially the
succession of baby-boom and baby-bust periods). In North-America the ageing of the population
is less striking, probably because of high immigration. The rise in the tax-to-GDP ratio is thus
25less strong, of around 4 percentage points (from 24.3% in 2000 to 28.7% in 2050) and continues
to increase over the whole 21st century. It stabilizes at the long-run value of 30.3%.
A.5 Tax-to-GDP ratio and immigration policies in the benchmark
case
Figure 6 depicts the effects of different increased immigration policies on the tax-to-GDP ratio.
It compares moderate selective (70%/30% of additional migrants are skilled/unskilled) and non-
selective (30%/70%) immigration policies with extreme selective (100%/0% of additional immi-
grants are skilled/unskilled) and non-selective (0%/100%) immigration policies. In Europe, mod-
erate selective (’IMMI-S’) and moderate non-selective (’IMMI-U’) immigration policies decrease
the tax-to-GDP ratio by respectively 2.82% and 3.23%. The difference in the reduction of the
tax-to-GDP ratio is more marked between a radical selective (’IMMI-S-100’) and a non-selective
(’IMMI-U-100’) policy: a decline of 2.48% respectively 3.52%. In North-America, moderate se-
lective (’IMMI-S’) and non-selective (’IMMI-U’) policies decrease taxes by 4.71% and 5.32%,
radical ones by 4.20% and 5.72% in 2050.
Figure 6: Tax-to-GDP ratio under extreme immigration policies









BSL IMMI−U IMMI−S IMMI−U−100% IMMI−S−100%









BSL IMMI−U IMMI−S IMMI−U−100% IMMI−S−100%
BSL is the baseline, IMMI-U, IMMI-S, IMMI-U-100 and IMMI-S-100 stand for the scenarios of increased immigration when
respectively 30%, 70%, 0% and 100% of the additional migrants are skilled.
A.6 Skill premium in the benchmark model
The skill premium is deﬁned as the skilled to unskilled wage ratio. An acceleration in skill-biased
technical change increases the wage inequality among skill groups, while a rise in the supply of
skills (Advanced Countries) reduces it (ﬁgure 7).
26Figure 7: Skill premium with respect to the baseline
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BSL is the baseline, RA-S and RA-U stand for the scenarios of postponement in retirement age of skilled respectively unskilled
individuals, SBTC and EDU are respectively the scenarios in which skill-biased technical change and education levels increase.
A.7 Results under the variant model
In both regions and under both speciﬁcations of the model, the delay in retirement age (for skilled
andunskilled) and higher skill-biased technical change havesimilar effects onthe tax-to-GDP ratio
and per capita GDP. However, with the "unemployment variant", the effect of a higher supply of
skills on the tax-to-GDP ratio and on per capita GDP is more pronounced. It will decrease the
tax-to-GDP ratio by slightly more than with the competitive model (0.8% against 0.1% compared
to the baseline), but it raises per capita GDP by 8.9% instead of 7% with the benchmark model
(see ﬁgures 8 and 9 in appendix). In addition, rendering the wage of unskilled workers more
competitive doesn’t affect very much taxes and per capita GDP. It will reduce the tax-to-GDP
ratio by only 0.67% compared to the baseline and increase per capita GDP by only 1.7% in the
long run.
27Figure 8: Tax-to-GDP ratio w.r.t. the baseline with the variant model
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BSL is the baseline, RA-S and RA-U stand for the scenarios of postponement in retirement age of skilled respectively unskilled
individuals, SBTC and EDU are respectively the scenarios in which skill-biased technical change and education levels increase. CW
is the additional scenario under the variant model, in which the unskilled wage is rendered more competitive.
Figure 9: Per capita GDP w.r.t. the baseline with the variant model
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BSL is the baseline, RA-S and RA-U stand for the scenarios of postponement in retirement age of skilled respectively unskilled
individuals, SBTC and EDU are respectively the scenarios in which skill-biased technical change and education levels increase. CW
is the additional scenario under the variant model, in which the unskilled wage is rendered more competitive.
28Figure 10: Skill premium w.r.t. the baseline with the variant model








BSL RA−U RA−S SBTC EDU CW IMMI−U IMMI−S








BSL RA−U RA−S SBTC IMMI−U IMMI−S
BSL is the baseline, RA-S and RA-U stand for the scenarios of postponement in retirement age of skilled respectively unskilled
individuals, SBTC and EDU are respectively the scenarios in which skill-biased technical change and education levels increase. CW
is the additional scenario under the variant model, in which the unskilled wage is rendered more competitive.
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